Research statement
My research interests include metaphysics, epistemology, methodology, and pedagogy. Although my own philosophical background is largely based in first order metaphysics, with some metametaphysics thrown in, I am more generally interested in what it is that philosophers do, and how philosophy evolves and progresses over time. I am particularly interested in the methods and tools philosophers use to further their goals with respect to inquiry and research. These tools vary, and include a priori methods like conceptual analysis, inference to the best explanation, phenomenology, appeal to intuitions, transcendental arguments, conceivability, and etc. The philosopher's toolkit is not exhausted by a priori methods, however. Experimental philosophy has shown that the tools available to philosophers can include the empirical methods used by scientists. Along with these methods there are various related issues that I am also interested in. Examples of such issues include the idea of progress in philosophy, peer disagreement, interdisciplinary work between philosophy and the sciences, and so on. Finally, my interest in methodology applies to and enriches my interest in pedagogy. Coming to a better understanding of what it is that philosophers do will in turn aid the development of philosophical teaching. Being more effective at teaching students to become better philosophers, even if most don't pursue a career or even a major in philosophy, is surely a good thing, especially given the current social and political climate.
My own dissertation serves as an illustration of my own evolution with respect to my research interests. I began graduate school with a primary interest in first order metaphysics. As I read through debates regarding time, persistence, properties, modal metaphysics, material constitution, mereology, and so on, I reached a point of aporia. It bothered me that my own philosophical convictions would sway dramatically depending on what I happened to read that day. I decided that my dissertation would be a form of philosophical therapy. My dissertation research would help me learn how metaphysics was done, and how I could think more fruitfully about these first order issues.
I thought about method in metaphysics in terms of epistemology. What exactly did it take in order for my belief in some proposition in metaphysics to be justified? At the time of the dissertation's writing, topics like grounding, fundamentality, and metaphysical explanation were (and probably still are) quite popular. After reading a good bit of the literature, I started to think about how metaphysical explanation could be applied to the epistemology of metaphysics. This led to my developing a theory of epistemic justification in chapter two of my dissertation that incorporated metaphysical explanation. Roughly stated, an individual's belief in some metaphysical proposition is justified if that proposition metaphysically explains some set of relevant evidence. So, given this view of justification, understanding where I stood with respect to first order metaphysical debates required understanding what exactly the evidence was, and how different positions metaphysically explained the evidence.
My own theory of justification provided an epistemological framework for doing first order metaphysics. The kind of first order metaphysics that was (and still is) prevalent relied primarily on a priori theorizing. However, there was a growing trend of skepticism with respect to this kind of a priori theorizing. This skeptical movement favored what might be called "methodological naturalism." Methodological naturalism is a kind of methodology that privileges scientific methodology. It can be stated normatively as something like, "One should not pursue philosophical inquiry that lies outside of the goals and means of science." Methodological naturalists are skeptical of traditional a priori metaphysics in part because they are skeptical of the evidence that these metaphysical theories purport to explain. Chapter three of my dissertation focuses on the epistemic legitimacy of a priori evidence. There I argue, contra the methodological naturalists, that evidence that is relevant for metaphysical theorizing can be known a priori, thus securing a place for traditional first order metaphysics to do its investigative work.
Another methodological issue that I addressed in my dissertation is peer disagreement. Peer disagreement occurs when two parties disagree regarding the truth of some claims. Both parties are intellectual on a par, and both have access to the same evidence for and against the claim in question. One major question with respect to peer disagreement has to do with the justification of each of the disagreeing parties. Given the presence of disagreement, what should happen with respect to the justification of each party? Some say that each party should "split the difference" by revising their credence to the average of the two credences. Others say that there should be no revision with respect to either party's credences. The issue of peer disagreement is particularly salient in metaphysics, where it seems that peers have been disagreeing with respect to some issue for centuries. In chapter four of my dissertation, I argue that individuals involved in metaphysical debates should not have to revise their credences because it turns out that there is no peer disagreement. There is no peer disagreement because, technically speaking, there are no peers. One necessary condition for x to be a peer of y, is that x and y share the same evidence. However, I argue that disputing parties do not share the same evidence because in metaphysical debates, disputing parties often disagree as to what the relevant evidence. Thus, debates in metaphysics often come down to debates about what counts as relevant evidence for metaphysical theorizing.
Given that metaphysical debates often come down to debates regarding the relevance of the evidence, in the final chapter of my dissertation I suggest a way forward in metaphysical methodology that focuses on the evidence. In this chapter, I argue that one reason why it seems that sciences progresses and metaphysics does not is that there is that there is a high degree of consensus with respect to empirical evidence. It does not seem that there is the same level of consensus with respect to a priori evidence. One of my main contentions in this chapter is to point out that we actually don't really know whether or not there's consensus with respect to a priori evidence because we never really investigated people's a priori beliefs. I argued that it would be fruitful to find out where the philosophical communities, as well and laypersons in general, stand when it comes to the sort of a priori principles that serve as evidence for metaphysical theorizing. Here experimental philosophy could do some fruitful work investigating where we stand with the evidence, i.e. where there is consensus or not. Such inquiry may lead to progress in metaphysics that is similar to the progress we observe in science.
These issues and research interests feed into my research interests in pedagogy. I have a lot of interest in how philosophy is most effectively taught. Having a better understanding of how philosophy is done will have fruitful applications on how we teach philosophy. This is the case because the teaching of philosophy should not be a transmission of some set of propositions. Rather, teaching philosophy should be a development of one's ability to philosophize. This ability comes by way of practicing the methods of philosophy. So, the better we understand these methods, the better position we are in to effectively teach these methods to our students, thus increasing the likelihood the they become better philosophers. This something that is surely worthwhile in this day and age.
My own dissertation serves as an illustration of my own evolution with respect to my research interests. I began graduate school with a primary interest in first order metaphysics. As I read through debates regarding time, persistence, properties, modal metaphysics, material constitution, mereology, and so on, I reached a point of aporia. It bothered me that my own philosophical convictions would sway dramatically depending on what I happened to read that day. I decided that my dissertation would be a form of philosophical therapy. My dissertation research would help me learn how metaphysics was done, and how I could think more fruitfully about these first order issues.
I thought about method in metaphysics in terms of epistemology. What exactly did it take in order for my belief in some proposition in metaphysics to be justified? At the time of the dissertation's writing, topics like grounding, fundamentality, and metaphysical explanation were (and probably still are) quite popular. After reading a good bit of the literature, I started to think about how metaphysical explanation could be applied to the epistemology of metaphysics. This led to my developing a theory of epistemic justification in chapter two of my dissertation that incorporated metaphysical explanation. Roughly stated, an individual's belief in some metaphysical proposition is justified if that proposition metaphysically explains some set of relevant evidence. So, given this view of justification, understanding where I stood with respect to first order metaphysical debates required understanding what exactly the evidence was, and how different positions metaphysically explained the evidence.
My own theory of justification provided an epistemological framework for doing first order metaphysics. The kind of first order metaphysics that was (and still is) prevalent relied primarily on a priori theorizing. However, there was a growing trend of skepticism with respect to this kind of a priori theorizing. This skeptical movement favored what might be called "methodological naturalism." Methodological naturalism is a kind of methodology that privileges scientific methodology. It can be stated normatively as something like, "One should not pursue philosophical inquiry that lies outside of the goals and means of science." Methodological naturalists are skeptical of traditional a priori metaphysics in part because they are skeptical of the evidence that these metaphysical theories purport to explain. Chapter three of my dissertation focuses on the epistemic legitimacy of a priori evidence. There I argue, contra the methodological naturalists, that evidence that is relevant for metaphysical theorizing can be known a priori, thus securing a place for traditional first order metaphysics to do its investigative work.
Another methodological issue that I addressed in my dissertation is peer disagreement. Peer disagreement occurs when two parties disagree regarding the truth of some claims. Both parties are intellectual on a par, and both have access to the same evidence for and against the claim in question. One major question with respect to peer disagreement has to do with the justification of each of the disagreeing parties. Given the presence of disagreement, what should happen with respect to the justification of each party? Some say that each party should "split the difference" by revising their credence to the average of the two credences. Others say that there should be no revision with respect to either party's credences. The issue of peer disagreement is particularly salient in metaphysics, where it seems that peers have been disagreeing with respect to some issue for centuries. In chapter four of my dissertation, I argue that individuals involved in metaphysical debates should not have to revise their credences because it turns out that there is no peer disagreement. There is no peer disagreement because, technically speaking, there are no peers. One necessary condition for x to be a peer of y, is that x and y share the same evidence. However, I argue that disputing parties do not share the same evidence because in metaphysical debates, disputing parties often disagree as to what the relevant evidence. Thus, debates in metaphysics often come down to debates about what counts as relevant evidence for metaphysical theorizing.
Given that metaphysical debates often come down to debates regarding the relevance of the evidence, in the final chapter of my dissertation I suggest a way forward in metaphysical methodology that focuses on the evidence. In this chapter, I argue that one reason why it seems that sciences progresses and metaphysics does not is that there is that there is a high degree of consensus with respect to empirical evidence. It does not seem that there is the same level of consensus with respect to a priori evidence. One of my main contentions in this chapter is to point out that we actually don't really know whether or not there's consensus with respect to a priori evidence because we never really investigated people's a priori beliefs. I argued that it would be fruitful to find out where the philosophical communities, as well and laypersons in general, stand when it comes to the sort of a priori principles that serve as evidence for metaphysical theorizing. Here experimental philosophy could do some fruitful work investigating where we stand with the evidence, i.e. where there is consensus or not. Such inquiry may lead to progress in metaphysics that is similar to the progress we observe in science.
These issues and research interests feed into my research interests in pedagogy. I have a lot of interest in how philosophy is most effectively taught. Having a better understanding of how philosophy is done will have fruitful applications on how we teach philosophy. This is the case because the teaching of philosophy should not be a transmission of some set of propositions. Rather, teaching philosophy should be a development of one's ability to philosophize. This ability comes by way of practicing the methods of philosophy. So, the better we understand these methods, the better position we are in to effectively teach these methods to our students, thus increasing the likelihood the they become better philosophers. This something that is surely worthwhile in this day and age.